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Playing the God Game: the perils of religious 
fictionalism 
(in Yujin Nagasawa and Andrei Buckareff, ed., Alternative Conceptions of God, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 
 
Robin Le Poidevin 
 
 
1. A tale of two church-goers 
 
Reginald and Fiona are regular church-goers. They sing hymns, join in prayers, discuss the 
sermon afterwards and often meet to read passages of the Bible together and explore the 
meanings and implications of those passages. They seem to the neutral onlooker to be equally 
engaged in these activities, equally inspired by them, and equally inclined to relate them to 
their everyday lives.  
 Behaviourally, then, there is nothing to distinguish the religious attitudes of these two 
individuals. However, on questioning, each gives a very different philosophical account of 
the basis of that behaviour: 
 Reginald is a realist. More specifically he is a realist believer. He takes God-
talksubject to an important qualificationat face-value, and as true by virtue of the way 
the world is independently of human belief. He takes statements about God to refer to a real, 
mind-independent being. The important qualification is that this face-value approach applies 
to the most central statements of his religion, including the doctrinal statements. He 
recognises that a significant proportion of scripture is metaphorical, or couched in terms of 
stories and parables. He is a realist, but not a fundamentalist. 
 Fiona is a fictionalist. When engaging in religious language and practice, she takes 
herself to be engaging in a (rather complex) game of make-believe. This attitude goes 
together with a corresponding view of the semantics of theistic statements: she takes their 
truth-conditions to be definable by the theological fiction, and the apparently denoting terms 
to refer to fictional characters and situations. When she asserts µ*RGORYHVXV¶, for example, 
she takes this to be true, but by virtue of the content of the relevant fiction. The general 
schema that she subscribes to is this: any given theological statement p is true if and only if it 
is true in the theological fiction that p. 
 Sometimes they get together with Andy the anthropological reconstructionist, who 
thinks that theological discourse is, despite its surface content, really about human ideals, 
Nora the non-cognitivist, who thinks that theological discourse is expressive rather than 
propositional, so utterances couched in that language (for the most part) simply lack truth-
valueand Agnes the agnostic.1 These positions provide an important contrast and 
                                                 
1
 Apparently, Andy has read and been inspired by the writings of Tillich and Bultmann. Nora has 
similarly been inspired by the writings of Wittgenstein, and feels that her view of religious language 
captures his. Naturally, other Wittgenstein scholars disagree with her on this tricky exegetical issue. 
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comparison with the first two, but it is really with Reginald and Fiona that we are initially 
most concerned.  
 We might imagine the history of the interactions between Reginald and Fiona (and 
Andy, Nora and Agnes, when they are around) as being divided into two phases: before they 
become aware of their radically different interpretations of the nature of theological discourse 
and afterwards, when each confesses to the other what they take the nature and point of the 
discourse to be. But how different would the two phases be? We might suppose that, perhaps 
after the initial surprise (at least RQ5HJLQDOG¶VSDUW, the friends decide that there is no reason 
why they should not continue exactly as before, since the differences between them are not so 
much religious as meta-religious. That is, they concern issues that arise when we reflect on 
religious activity, as opposing to participating in it. Such meta-religious issues will concern 
questions about the content, justification, or role of religious language, beliefs or practices. 
Recognising that, in any case, there will be, within any religious community, divergence of 
views of one sort or another, the friends feel that a spirit of philosophical ecumenism is called 
for, and that this diversity of interpretative perspectives is likely to enhance, rather than 
undermine, their religiously-motivated interactions with each other. Such, at any rate, is their 
hope.  
 We may wonder, however, how far this spirit of philosophical ecumenism can prevail. 
Can a religious community in which realist belief represents the dominant outlook 
accommodate fictionalists? We might expect the common ground between realists and 
fictionalists to be relatively limited, and the state of peaceful co-existence between them to be 
only on the surface, concealing deeper disagreements. After all, whereas the realists are 
genuinely trying to make contact with a transcendent being, the fictionalists are merely 
playing the God game. Are these sceptical doubts justified? 
 Before engaging with that quHVWLRQOHWXVH[SORUH)LRQD¶VILFWLRQDOLVWRXWORRNLQPRUH
detail. 
 
 
2. Fictionalism: semantics and attitude 
 
Fictionalist approaches have been proposed for a variety of discourses: there is, for example, 
fictionalism about numbers, fictionalism about possible worlds, and fictionalism about moral 
values.2 What characterises these positions is a distinctive view of the semantics of the 
discourse in question. Take modal fictionalism as the model. The modal fictionalist notes that 
a possible world semantics of modal discourse has much going for it, in that it allows us to 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHRWKHUZLVHRSDTXHPRGDORSHUDWRUVµQHFHVVDULO\µSRVVLEO\¶µLPSRVVLEO\¶LQ
WHUPVRITXDQWLILHUVUDQJLQJRYHUZRUOGVµLQDOOZRUOGV¶µLQVRPHZRUOGV¶µLQQRZRUOGV¶. 
By this means we can justify the modal axioms in terms, for example, of relations between 
sets of worlds. The set of all worlds clearly includes some ZRUOGVVRµQHFHVVDULO\p¶HQWDLOV
µSRVVLEO\p¶DQGVRRQ%XWWKLVJDLQLQH[SODQDWRU\SRZHUFRPHVLWVHHPV at an ontological 
price: we are committed to the existence of these worlds, and the question then arises of what 
their nature is: concrete or abstract? The modal fictionalist wants the explanatory power of 
                                                 
2
 See, respectively, Field (1980), Rosen (1990) and Joyce (2005). 
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possible world semantics without its ontological cost, and attempts to achieve this by 
importing the standard possible world semantics into a fictional context. We therefore 
consider a fiction in which there are, let us say, an infinite number of concrete possible 
worlds, of which this is only one, all other worlds being both spatially and temporally 
isolated from us, the unifying principle of a world therefore being a spatio-temporal one: x 
and y belong to the same world if and only if they stand in spatio-temporal relations to each 
other. Call this the µ&RQFUHWH3RVVLEOH:RUOG)LFWLRQ¶&3:). The fictionalist semantics 
now proceeds as follows: 
 
 Possibly (p) if and only if, according to the CPWF, p obtains in at least one world 
 
 Necessarily (p) if and only if, according to the CPWF, p obtains in all worlds 
 
This precisely mirrors the intuitive semantics for fictional truths: 
 
µ3LSJRHVWRVHH0LVV+DYHUVKDP¶LVWUXHLIDQGRQO\if, according to the fiction Great 
Expectations, Pip goes to see Miss Haversham 
 
The crucial question for the modal fictionalist is whether this semantics really can deliver all 
the explanatory benefits of possible world realism. Fictionalism about numbers proceeds in a 
similar fashion, as does moral fictionalism, which makes use of the fiction that there really 
exist objective moral values. 
 7KHWHUPµILFWLRQDOLVP¶LVLQFUHDVLQJO\XVHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUH to refer to a non-realist 
position on religion,3 but it appears not to be used to refer to an analogue of the fictionalist 
positions above. It is defined, rather, in error-theoretic terms: the semantics for theological 
statements is supposed to be realist, but the truth-conditions simply do not obtain.4 What 
makes such account appropriately describable as fictionalist is its characterisation of the 
attitude that should be taken towards theological statements: rather than regarding them as 
true, we should treat them as if they were true, and let them guide us accordingly. The 
motivation for so doing is the instrumental benefits religion brings. $QGE\µLQVWUXPHQWDO¶LV
not meant (here DWOHDVWµF\QLFDOO\FDOFXODWHG¶,WLVQRWWKHILFWLRQDOLVWLQWHQGVVLPSO\WRSXW
on a display of piety in order to win certain distinctly secular goods, such as a place for their 
children at a religious school. Rather, the hope is that engaging in religious activities would, 
for example, bring latent moral ideals into sharper focus. 
 It is important, then, to distinguish between a fictionalist semantics and a fictionalist 
attitude. But it is not clear that they are completely independent of each other. In particular, it 
is not clear that the attitude is rationally sustainable independently of the corresponding 
semantics. On the other hand, treating theological statements as if they were true clearly fits 
comfortably with the supposition that they are in fact fictional. That, arguably, is the purer 
position. So when ,XVHWKHWHUPµILFWLRQDOLVP¶LQ this essay I intend to refer to a position 
which proposes a fictionalist semantics: the fictionalist attitude will be the natural corollary. 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., Eshleman (2005). His characterisation of the position can be found on pp. 190-1. 
4
 See ibid., pp. 185-6. 
4 
 
Some of the concerns UDLVHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHDERXWµUHOLJLRXVILFWLRQDOLVP¶PD\DIIHFWWKH
µSXUH¶IRUPRIILFWLRQDOLVPDWLVVXHKHUHRWKHUVPD\QRW.  
 On the fictionalist account, the logical properties of theological discourse will be 
those of fictions. So, for example, the world defined by the theological fiction will be 
incomplete: there are some propositions that are neither true nor false in it, just as there is no 
fact of the matter as to whether or not Miss Haversham had a George II dressing table in her 
bedroom. In the God-fiction, bivalence is not preserved. Nevertheless, there is no reason to 
deny that it is fictionally complete; that is, it is not part of the fiction itself that some 
propositions lack truth-value. Similarly, God-talk is not closed under deduction: if it is true in 
the theological fiction that p and also true in the theological fiction that Not-p, it does not 
immediately follow that it is true in the fiction that (p and Not-p). Some inconsistency, 
therefore, may be tolerated, and does not generate, by the principle of Ex Falso Quodlibet, 
every proposition. 
 With the fictionalist position characterised, let us turn back to the relations between 
our three church-goers. 
 
 
3. Fiona and Reginald: the integration of fictionalists into a realist community 
 
On the face of it, Fiona and Reginald have a lot in common, making it relatively easy for 
them to maintain their policy of peaceful co-existence. Both agree that statements made in the 
language of God-talk are true. They agree on the decision procedures for deciding whether 
they are true: appeals to scripture, to canonical statements of doctrine, and to the implications 
of these. They may even both appeal to considerations of natural theology: the project of 
relating theological truth to natural phenomena. Natural theology is, of course, typically 
presented as a realist enterprise. But there is no reason why a fictionalist cannot incorporate 
the same kind of moves, for the religious fiction is not isolated from the real world. Features 
of the actual worldthe fine-tuning of the universe, for examplecan be incorporated into 
the religious fiction, and play a role within it. And indeed our understanding of ordinary 
fiction is almost always informed by knowledge of how things are in fact. A rudimentary 
understandLQJRIWKHZRUOG¶VDFWXDOJHRJUDSK\IRUH[DPSOHLVDUHTXLVLWHIRUIROORZLQJWKH
QDUUDWLYHRI-XOHV9HUQH¶VAround the World in Eighty Days. Similarly, an understanding of 
DFWXDO7XGRUKLVWRU\ZLOOHQULFKDUHDGLQJRI+LODU\0DQWHO¶VWolf Hall and similar historical 
novels. The authors of such novels will, of course, incorporate quite a bit of the relevant 
history, but some of this background readers might supply for ourselves, particularly if they 
are minded to extend the events of the novel in their own imagination. Such extension is 
precisely what the fictionalist about religious discourse may wish to engage in. So Fiona need 
not absent herself from conversations with Reginald about natural theology. 
 Nor need Fiona insist that Reginald is mistaken about the truth-conditions of the 
statements he utters. For if fictional discourse requires fictive intention, Reginald, who has no 
such intention, cannot be mistaken in providing a realist semantics for his statements. (He 
would, however, be mistaken if he extended that realist semantics to the statements made by 
Fiona.) 
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 Both, too, can give religious discourse a central role in shaping their moral and 
spiritual outlook. Seeing the world through the interpretative framework of God-centred 
discourse allows them both to get more clearly in focus what is of most value in life: love for 
RWKHUVGLVSODFHPHQWRIWKHVHOIIURPWKHFHQWUHRIRQH¶VSURMHFWVWKHYRLFHRIFRQVFLHQFHWKH
subordination of short-term goals for long-term ones, etc. None of this, of course, is 
inaccessible from the atheistic perspectiveit would be arrogant to suggest otherwisebut it 
is much more accessible (argue Reginald and Fiona) if one inhabits the theistic framework. 
 :KDWKDSSHQVZKHQ)LRQDDQG5HJLQDOG¶VFRQYHUVDWLRQWXUQVWRWKHSURblem of evil? 
Reginald feels some pressure to reconcile his realist belief in the goodness of God with the 
evident fact of suffering. Fiona is entirely willing to engage with this issue. After all, it is 
important to her that the fiction is not isolated from real human concerns, and also that the 
fiction is not (in any obvious way) internally inconsistent. Eventually, after having considered 
various theodicies which might make sense of suffering, Reginald proposes that, although 
there most certainly is a solution to the problem of evil, for there is both suffering and a 
loving God, that solution is probably beyond the comprehension of the human mind. Fiona 
can readily agree. For the existence of a solution to the problem of evil that is unknown to us 
is entirely compatible with the logic of fiction. As we observed above, a fiction is incomplete: 
some propositions will lack a truth-value within the fiction, since whatever account of truth-
in-fiction we adopt, the truth-value of some propositions will be underdetermined by that 
account. Among those propositions lacking a truth-value in the religious fiction may be any 
statement of a particular theodicy (it is not to be found in any of the canonical writings, but 
only in interpretative commentaries which lack the authority of those writings). And if p is 
neither true nor false in the fiction, it cannot be a known fact. However, the fiction is still 
fictionally complete: that is, it is fictionally true that, for any proposition, bivalence holds. 
The fictionalist can, therefore, entirely consistently hold that there is a solution to the problem 
of evili.e. that it is true in the fiction that there is such a solution, even if for no p, is p the 
solution. 
 We may wonder, however, if the appearance of genuine communication between 
Reginald and Fiona is genuine. Sentences uttered by Reginald will certainly sound the same 
as sentences uttered by Fiona, and there will be a significant number of sentences to which 
they are both prepared to give assent. But the truth-conditions of a sentence uttered by 
Reginald, and an apparently identical one as uttered by Fiona, will be quite different. The 
UHDOLVW¶VWDONRI*RGLILWSLFNVRXWDQ\WKLQJSLFNVRXWDUHDOWUDQVFHQGHQWEHLQJRWKHUZLVHLW
simply fails to refer. The fictionaOLVW¶VWDONRI*RGLQFRQWUDVWSLFNVRXWDILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU
and, given the framework, it cannot fail to do so. Different semantics, different content, and 
so (it seems) no genuine communication. On the other hand, it is quite implausible to suggest 
that sentences have completely different meanings depending on whether they occur in a 
fictional or non-fictional contextµ7KHFDWLVRQWKHPDW¶DVXWWHUHGE\DILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU
conjures up the same image in the mind of the reader as that same sentence uttered in real 
life. We do not need a translation manual to be able to read a novel written in our own 
language. Statements about a cat in a fictional context really do represent a cat (just a purely 
intentional one). And any doubts that Reginald and Fiona are using words to mean the same 
things can be put to rest by checking that they both agree on the inferential patterns exhibited 
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E\*RGVWDWHPHQWV%RWKDJUHHIRUH[DPSOHWKDWµ*RGVSRNHWR0RVHV¶HQWDLOVµ*RGVSRNHWR
VRPHRQH¶ In the context of sSHFLILFWKHRULHVRIPHDQLQJDGPLWWHGO\WKHPHDQLQJRIµ)LUH¶
DVXWWHUHGLQDEXUQLQJEXLOGLQJZLOOQRWEHWKHVDPHDVWKHPHDQLQJRIµ)LUH¶DVXWWHUHGE\
an actor on stage. If we apply *ULFH¶VWKHRU\RIPHDQLQJIRUH[DPSOH5 we will understand 
the first in terms of what the uttered wants us to believe, the second in terms of what the 
author wants us to imagine. But there will be a very significant, and asymmetric, connection. 
As we might put it, the meaning in a fictional context is parasitic on the meaning in a non-
fictional context. It is because a non-ILFWLRQDOXWWHUDQFHRIµ)LUH¶PHDQVZKDWLWGRHVWKDWD
ILFWLRQDOXWWHUDQFHRIµ)LUH¶PHDQVZKDWit does. 
 The apparent robustness of the agreement between Reginald and Fiona, then, provides 
some hope that fictionalists can be integrated into a realist community. Three difficulties, 
however, arise for DILFWLRQDOLVWDSSURSULDWLRQRIWKHODQJXDJHDQGSUDFWLFHRIWKHUHDOLVW¶V
religion. They concern, respectively: the content of religious language, the experience of 
religious activity, and the relation between religious doctrine and behaviour. Let us look at 
these in turn. 
 
 
4. Choosing the right fiction 
 
Any form of fictionalism depends for its success on a clearly-defined fiction. Modal 
fictionalism, for example, can exploit the fact that there already exists a well worked-out 
modal semantics in the form of concrete possible world realism. Given that realism can 
provide, for any modal proposition, a statement of its truth-conditions, so can fictionalism. 
$OOWKHILFWLRQDOLVWKDVWRGRLVWRSUHFHGHWKDWVWDWHPHQWZLWKWKHµ$FFRUGLQJWRWKHFRQFUHWH
SRVVLEOHZRUOGILFWLRQ«¶RSHUDWRU7KLVLVQRWWKHRQO\ILFWLRQDOVWRU\WKDWFRXOGEHWROGDERXW
the modal, but the fictionalist can decide, among the competing realist accounts, which offers 
the most satisfactory semantics,6 and adopt that as the preferred fiction.7 A similar procedure 
suggests itself for number fictionalism.  
 But with religious fictionalism, it is not so clear that one preferred fiction will emerge. 
There are at least as many religious fictions as there are religious traditions. This in itself is 
not troubling for the fictionalist, for part of the instrumental value of religion is its role in 
forming cohesive communities, unified by a common discourse and a common set of ideals. 
Adopting a religious tradition identifies one with a particular religious community. So the 
selection of any given religion is much more likely to be determined by cultural factors than 
by a judgement concerning semantics. Only one religion may in practice be a live contender. 
(This is not to deny, what is plainly the case, that people occasionally move from one religion 
to another, but typically this happens for decidedly non-fictionalist reasons.) And it is 
important, for instrumental reasons, that one religious fiction is chosen. Imagine a fictionalist 
who simply moves at whim from one religion to another. At any one time, there is a 
                                                 
5
 See Grice (1957). 
6
 :KDWGRHVµVDWLVIDFWRU\¶DPRXQWWRKHUH"7ZRWKLQJVDWOHDVWH[SUHVVLYHSRZHUi.e. the range of 
types of modal statements that are provided with a semantics; and respect for the inferential patterns 
we know to exist in modal discourse. 
7
 For doubts concerning the modal fictionalist project, however, see Divers (1995). 
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consistent semantics for their utterances: it just happens to be a different semantics on 
different occasions. It is hard to see that this involves anything other than a very provisional, 
and perhaps also superficial, commitment to the religious life. In contrast, a fictionalist who 
stays true to a particular religious fiction is in a better position to explore it more deeply, to 
let it guide them more thoroughly. 
Having selected a particular religion, however, further choices have to be made. For 
within a religious traditionand this is abundantly true of Christianitythere will, within the 
realist community, be a variety of ideas concerning which parts of the discourse are to be 
taken literally, and which regarded as purely symbolic, or metaphorical. This is so even of so 
central a Christian doctrine as the Incarnation. There are realists who take the doctrine at face 
value, and assert that God the Son really did live a human life on Earth. But there are others 
who, while taking a realist view of God-WDONLQJHQHUDODGRSWDµQRQ-,QFDUQDWLRQDO¶
Christology: that is, they take Jesus to be simply and purely human, but as having a unique 
relationship to God which is metaphorically captured in terms of divine incarnation. This is 
not a trivial difference, given the central role of the doctrine of the Incarnation in the 
Christian religion. So which view will the fictionalist adopt, and on what grounds? 
 It might be thought that a fictionalist will naturally side with the non-incarnational 
Christologist, as both will agree that, literally understood, the doctrine of the Incarnation is 
false, so the point of continuing to use incarnational language must lie elsewhere. But it does 
not follow that in the fiction, incarnational language must be taken metaphorically, for else 
the same reasoning would recommend that every statement uttered within the fiction is to be 
construed metaphorically. On the other hand, the fictionalist is not obliged to say that, 
fictionally, God lived on Earth as a human being. For even within fictional discourse, the 
distinction between the literal and the metaphorical can be maintained. That is, it may be 
fictionally true that it is metaphorical that God lived on Earth. So there is a genuine choice for 
the fictionalist to make here. The fictionalist may choose to wait until the debate between the 
two realist factions is concluded, and then adopt whichever emerges as the preferred view. 
But this is unsatisfactory, first, because the issue will not be concluded, and second because 
reasons for preferring one interpretation of the Incarnation within an essentially realist 
context may not carry over to the fictionalist context.  
 This is just one case in which the fictionalist is faced with more than one story to 
choose between, and the grounds for choosing one over the other are not clear. How will 
Fiona respond? She may point out that the indeterminacy of any fiction invites us to explore 
different fictional paths. We might take a given fictional narrative as a trunk from which may 
sprout different fictional branches, corresponding to different ways in which the narrative 
might be developed. Engaging with the fiction might involve a certain amount of hopping 
from branch to branchand so it is, explains Fiona, with the religious fiction. We do not 
need to prioritise one branch over another. (Though, bearing in mind the reasons given above 
against the practice of a fickle fictionalism that simply moves through different religious 
traditions, the hopping should not get out of hand.)  
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5. Public and private prayer 
 
One very obvious difference one would expect between realism and fictionalism is an 
experiential one. ,WMXVWLVQ¶WJRLQJWRIHHOWKHVDPHLIRQHDEDQGRQVWKHUHDOLVWRXWORRNLQ
favour of a fictionalist one. Taking it all to be real, and engaging in pretence, are two very 
different states of mind. Shifting between active engagement with religion on the one hand, 
and cool reflection on its content and import on the other, is for the fictionalist likely to result 
in a certain amount of cognitive dissonance, or so one would have thought. For the active 
engagement to work, awareness of the fictionalist interpretation has to be suppressed 
(compare being with someone who, throughout a particularly emotional and absorbing film, 
VD\VµLW¶VRQO\DILOPLW¶VQRWUHDOO\KDSSHQLQJ¶ And this is likely to become especially acute 
when moving from the public to the private sphere. In an act of public worship, and perhaps 
particularly when a significant number of those participating are realists, the fictionalist will 
be caught up in the solemnity, joyfulness and intensity of the occasion. It is comparatively 
easy, in those circumstances, to engage fully with the fiction (as the fictionalist sees it). The 
interpretative semantics is IDUIURPWKHIRUHIURQWRIRQH¶VPLQG But public worship does not 
H[KDXVWWKHUHDOLVW¶VUHSHUWRLUHRIUHOLJLRXVSractices: there is also the time spent in private 
prayer, time to which the realist would attach considerable value and importance. What will 
the fictionalist do? 
 /HW¶VFRQVLGHUILUVWWKHUHDVRQV5HJLQDOGPLJKWKDYHIRUHQJDJLQJLQSULYDWHSUD\HU
First, he may use it to petition God for various things he desires, in the hope that God will 
grant his requests. Second, he may use it for companionship, to help him feel closer to God. 
Third, he may use it for something intermediate between these: to align his will with the will 
of God. By coming closer to God in prayer, he hopes to become aware of the divine will, and 
in so doing reorient, as far as possible, his own desires.  
 Can any of these have a FRXQWHUSDUWLQ)LRQD¶VRXWORRN"The first, prayer as petition, 
seems ruled out at once. Fiona cannot but be aware that no-one is there to grant her requests, 
and the attempt to make such a request will surely strike her as a sham. There can be no 
willing suspension of belief here. But this may not be the loss it appears. After all, even 
realists may have reason to be suspicious of petitionary prayer. Can we really ask God to 
intervene, if he does not already judge it appropriate to do so? Either what will happen, 
without intervention, is already in accordance with what he ordains, in which case 
intervention will make things worse, or it is not in accordance with the divine will, but 
intervention would not be compatible with the desire to allow humans to shape the world by 
their own unaided actions.8 And in any case, the realist may take the view that petitionary 
prayer is something we should grow out of. Rather than asking God to fix things, as if we 
were children, we should UDWKHUVHHRXUVHOYHVDVWKHLQVWUXPHQWVRI*RG¶VSXUSRVH6R
although Fiona cannot, without a serious degree of self-GHFHSWLRQUHSOLFDWHWKHUHDOLVW¶VXVH
of petitionary prayer, this may not be such a problem, from the mature religious viewpoint. 
 What of the second use of prayer, the seeking after companionship? For Fiona, there 
is no companion, and praying as if there is, for the sake of companionship, invites 
FRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHVDGFDVHRIVRPHRQH¶VSLFNLQJXSWKHWHOHSKRQHDQGWU\LQJWRLJQRUHWKH
                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Basinger (1983). 
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dialling tone) having a pretend, and very one-sided, conversation, in the vain hope that they 
will feel a little less lonely. Surely, then, this second use of prayer can have no genuine 
FRXQWHUSDUWLQ)LRQD¶VOLIH 
 7KDWPLJKWVHHPWRUXOHRXWWKHWKLUGXVHRISUD\HUWRRWKHDOLJQLQJRIRQH¶VZLOOZLWK
the will of God. There is no (real) will of God if there is no (real) God. But might one 
QHYHUWKHOHVVDWWHPSWWRDOLJQRQH¶VZLOOZLWKZKDWRQHLPDJLQHVwould be the will of God? 
Fictional character though he may be, God represents for Fiona a moral ideal, an expression 
of perfect love. There is nothing self-GHFHSWLYHLQ)LRQD¶VJHQXLQHDWWHPSWWRRUGHUKHUZLOOLQ
accordance with this ideal. But then, it will be objected, there is no need for Fiona to do this 
through the medium of prayer. All she need do is to contemplate that ideal, and attempt to 
order her desires accordingly. There is no need for a fake attempt at communication. 
Nevertheless, Fiona may find that a cool contemplation of an ideal is not sufficient. She 
needs to enter more imaginatively into a vision of pure love. Prayer might be just the medium 
for that imaginative state. It is not, of course, an act of communication, and indeed it need not 
take precisely that form. It might, rather, be a meditation, and one in which Fiona might find 
it helpful to voice, in her head, her own thoughts, as if they were addressed to another person, 
and imagine what someone motivated only by love would say in response. And, without there 
being any actually hallucinatory experience, answers may come to her as if they did not have 
their origin in her own thoughts. Phenomenologically, this could have a great deal in common 
with the experience of prayer that many realists have. 
 There is one other aspect of prayer that might come under this third heading, which 
the fictionalist cannot wholly replicate, and that is the wrestling with doubt that even the 
staunchest realist is subject to IURPWLPHWRWLPHµ+HOSWKRXPLQH XQEHOLHI¶FULHVWKHUHDOLVW9 
Fiona is not subject to those doubts, since they cannot arise in the fictionalist framework. Is 
this a loss? Reginald might argue that this wrestling with doubt is part of the authentic 
UHOLJLRXVH[SHULHQFHVRPHWKLQJWKDWVKDUSHQVRQH¶VDZDUHQHVVRIWKHGHPDQGVRIDUHOLJLRXV
OLIHDQGDFRQVWDQWWHVWRIWKHVLQFHULW\RIRQH¶VIDLWK7KDWWKLVVKRXOGILQGQRFRXQWHUSDrt in 
)LRQD¶Vlife makes hers a less truly religious outlook. But perhaps, after all, there is a 
counterpart LQ)LRQD¶VSUD\HUV(DUOLHU,PHQWLRQHGWKHFRJQLWLYHGLVVRQDQFHWKDWWKUHDWHQV
WKHILFWLRQDOLVW¶VUHOLJLRXVHQJDJHPHQW$ZDUHQHVVRIWKHILFWLRQDl nature of what is being said 
DQGDSSHDOHGWRPD\DWDQ\WLPHEUHDNLQXSRQ)LRQD¶VVLQFHUHDWWHPSWWRLPPHUVHKHUVHOILQ
the fiction. Dealing with that dissonance, resisting its disruptive effect, bears some 
FRPSDULVRQWRWKHUHDOLVW¶VDWWHPSWWRFRSHZLth doubt. )XUWKHU)LRQD¶VOR\DOW\WRKHUFKRVHQ
fiction may be tested from time to time, when it confronts her with uncomfortable moral, 
psychological or spiritual truths, and on those occasions some effort of will is required not 
simply to abandon it.10 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Mark 9.24 
10
 I am very grateful to an anonymous reader for this suggestion. 
10 
 
6. Reasons and causes 
 
Another potential difference between realism and fictionalism is the role religious language 
plays in the shaping of behaviour. For Reginald, theistic statements stand in a reason-giving 
relation to moral attitudes. )RUH[DPSOHµ*RGORYHVXV¶H[SUHVVHVDUHDVRQWRORYHHDFKRWKHU
we are objectively lovable! For Fiona, it seems, such statements cannot be reason-providing 
in the same way, since the fictional truth that God loves us does not give us a reason to love 
each other. No merely fictional truth, it seems, can give us a reason to do anything. So it does 
not help to point out thDWLWLVILFWLRQDOO\WUXHWKDWµthe fact that God loves us gives us a reason 
to love each other¶IRUDJDLQZKDWFRXQWVDVDUHDVRQLQWKHILFWLRQKDVno implications for 
moral attitudes outside the fiction.  
 This is not to deny that engaging with fiction can shape and develop our moral 
understanding. Indeed this is part of its very considerable value. But more than one 
mechanism is at work. A fiction might alert us to certain truths about human nature (the 
characters will not, typically, be presented as having a wholly alien mentality), or present us 
with hypothetical dilemmas which test our moral understanding. In fiction, then, we may 
indeed find reasons for what we dobut then those reasons areQ¶W RUDUHQ¶WZKROO\ILFWLRQDO
truths. At a somewhat more immediate level, we find ourselves emotionally involved with the 
fictional characters. Notoriously, our anxiety, joy and sadness for them seem to sit side by 
side with a firm belief that they do not actually exist.11 That emotional involvement may then 
go on to alter our behaviour towards real people, in positive ways. Here, the relation between 
fictional truth is not so much reason-giving but causal. Or since (as Davidson (1963) 
plausibly argued) reasons can also be causes, we should avoid the implication that reasons are 
acausal, and say just WKDWILFWLRQVKDSHVRXUEHKDYLRXULQZD\VWKDWGRQ¶WDSSHDOWRUHDVRQV 
For the fictionalist, God-talk is wholly fictional. So the connection between such talk and 
subsequent behaviour is merely causal. God talk cannot, for the fictionalist, rationalise moral 
behaviour. For the realist, it can. 
 Perhaps, however, this difference, though non-trivial, is not enough to prevent the 
integration of fictionalists into the realist community. The important thing is that religious 
language continues to be behaviour-shaping; the precise mechanism by which it does so need 
not interfere with the actual business of religion, but is only the kind of thing to exercise 
philosophers (!). In any case, the fictionalist can resist the suggestion that the fictional 
statements of religion cannot be reason-giving. It can be part of engaging with the fiction that 
certain fictional statements are responded to as if they were true. And that may mark the 
difference between religious fiction and other fictions. With a film or novel it may be entirely 
appropriate to respond to it as if it were true, but only up to a point. That is, certain emotional 
responses might be appropriate, the kind that would also be appropriate if it were not fiction 
but fact. It would not, however, be appropriate to respond to a crime novel, for example, by 
ringing up the police to ask what they are doing about this horrible murder. But with the 
religious fiction, a deeper emotional and imaginative involvement will lead, not to 
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inappropriate attitudes and behaviour, but ones whose value for the self and the religious 
community vindicates that involvement. And that vindication is a form of rationalisation. 
 
 
7. Andy, Nora and Agnes 
  
So far, the differences between Fiona and Reginald look as if they are not so serious as to 
EUHDNXSWKHVHQVHRIFRPPRQJURXQGVXIILFLHQWO\WRZDUUDQW)LRQD¶VEDQLVKPHQWIURPa 
realist community. It is time now to invite the other representatives into the discussion, to see 
if they fare significantly better, or significantly worse.  
 Andy, recall, is the anthropological reconstructionist. He takes theological discourse 
to be translatable into statements about human ideals, and not actually about a transcendent 
being at all. Does he face the same kinds of challenge as Fiona? He would say that the choice 
between different interpretations of religious doctrine is, if a genuine one, a choice between 
different ideals. It is not clear, for example, that the dispute between incarnational and non-
incarnational Christology is one of ideals, rather than one that arises only for the realist (and 
fictionalist, insofar as every realist dispute has a fictionalist FRXQWHUSDUW)LRQD¶VSUREOHPLQ
making sense of private prayer, on the other hand, looks as if it will arise in exactly the same 
form for Andy. Prayer is not really an act of communication, so we need to have some other 
account. And the account that is available to Fiona is equally available to Andy. As for the 
issue of whether theological statements provide reasons for action, Andy will point out that, 
since theological statements are encoded moral ideals, they already contain within themselves 
recommendations for action. It seems overall, then, that Andy will find the challenges to 
fictionalism slightly less pressing. 
 On the other hand, Andy is faced with an objection not faced by Fiona: it is just 
implausible that every statement in God-talk can be mapped onto a corresponding statement 
about moral ideals. And when we make the attempt to do just that, some apparently different 
statements in God-talk will turn out to correspond to the same moral statement. The apparent 
richness and complexity of God-talk will then turn out to be something of a distraction. 
Fiona, in contrast, can do full justice to the richness of meaning in God-talk, as different 
statements will play different roles in the fiction. She can concede to Andy that there is a 
connection between God talk and moral ideals, but still insist that it is not as direct as Andy 
suggests. We often do read moral messages into a fictional narrative, without supposing that 
each statement can be translated into a corresponding moral statement. Fiona might even 
point out to Andy that in some sense her position absorbs his. Sometimes, instead of directly 
engaging with a fiction, losing ourselves in it, as it were, we want to take a critical stance 
towards it. We might, for example, want to describe the Shakespearean characters of Prince 
Hal, Henry IV and Richard II as representing three images of kingship. Then we are self-
consciously talking of fictional characters and the way they are constructed by the author. 
Andy, as Fiona might provocatively put it, is simply Fiona in critical mode. But, unlike 
Fiona, who can readily explain the emotional impact of religion in terms of engagement with 
fiction, Andy has nothing to offer on this score. 
 Nora the non-cognitivist is a variant of Andy, the difference between that, whereas 
Andy will take God-talk to assert moral ideals, Nora takes God-talk to express those ideals 
12 
 
MXVWDVµRZ¶H[SUHVVHVSDLQ12 Again, Fiona can say with some justification that her position 
DEVRUEV1RUD¶V,QVRIDUDVWKHILFWLRQPDNHVXVDZDUHRIcertain moral ideals, when we 
engage with it appropriately, it could be said to express them. But Fiona, unlike Nora, is not 
obliged to hold that each statement in God-talk expresses a specific ideal. 
 And so to our final character, Agnes the agnostic. The standard agnostic accepts the 
realist construal of theological statements: they are intended as being (more less) literally 
descriptive of reality. But the agnostic does not know whether they are in fact true or not, and 
may indeed hold that they are undecidable. So understood, there are degrees of agnosticism, 
corresponding to strengths of belief or doubt, and some realist believers may confess to a 
degree of agnosticism with respect to certain aspects of God talk. When Reginald talks of his 
wrestling witKGRXEWKHPD\DSSURSULDWHO\H[SUHVVWKLVLQWHUPVRIµDJQRVWLFPRPHQWV¶6R
there will be little difficulty, one would have thought, in integrating agnostics into a realist 
community. Nevertheless, there will always be the suspicion that agnostics are just a bit half-
hearted about religion. They are uncertain which particular religious account to adopt because 
they are uncertain whether one should adopt any religious account! They will approach 
SUD\HUZLWKDµKHGJLQJRQH¶VEHWV¶DWWLWXGH7KLVLVwell expressed by Anthony Kenny: the 
DJQRVWLFPD\SUD\LQWKHKRSHWKDWWKHUHLVVRPHRQHWKHUHUDWKHUOLNHVRPHRQHµDGULIWLQWKH
ocean, trapped in a cave, or stranded on a mountainside, who cries for help though he may 
never be heard or fires a signal which may QHYHUEHVHHQ¶13 And the agnostic (of this 
standard kind) will recognise theological statements as reasons for actions, but any doubts as 
to the truth of those statements will translate into uncertainty over the usefulness of the 
actions. Finally, any agnostic who recognises a significant degree of uncertainty about 
theological statements will probably want to refrain from uttering the creeds, for fear of bad 
faith, in the Sartrean sense14. So, altogether, the agnostic looks to be in a weaker position, vis-
à-vis full engagement with the religious life, than any of the other characters of this 
discussion. 
 But we have not yet asked Agnes about her views. Is she an agnostic of this standard 
kind? It turns out she is not. She concedes to the standard agnostic that, given a realist 
semantics, theological statements are undecidable. But she is undecided whether that is the 
appropriate semantics. Perhaps a fictionalist semantics is appropriate. It may be that a realist 
semantics is appropriate for part of God-talk, and a fictionalist semantics for the rest. But 
ZKHUHVKRXOGWKHOLQHEHGUDZQ"6KHGRHVQ¶WNQRZ7KLVPLJKWVHHPWREHUDWKHUDORWRI
doubt, and the others might be inclined to dismiss Agnes as thoroughly confused. However, 
Agnes can argue that she has an advantage over the standard agnostic, for she can guarantee 
WKHWUXWKRIWKHRORJLFDOVWDWHPHQWV6KHUHDVRQVDVIROORZVµ(LWKHUWKHUHDOLVWWUXWK-conditions 
obtain or they do not. If they do, I intend the statements to have realist truth-conditions; if 
they do not obtain, then I intend the statements to have fictionalist truth-conditions. Either 
way, they come out true, but in virtue of what they come out true I cannot say. So I can utter 
the creeds in good faith. And I can attach at least the same value to the statements as can the 
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fictionalist, and can contemplate the possibility that their value goes beyond that, in putting 
XVLQWRXFKZLWKDWUDQVFHQGHQWUHDOLW\¶ 
 $JQHVUHJUHWVWKDWWKHUHLVQRWDPRUHHOHJDQWQDPHIRUKHUSRVLWLRQµ6HPDQWLF
religiouVDJQRVWLFLVP¶LVWKHEHVWVKHFDQRIIHUIRUWKHWLPHEHLQJ,QVRIDUDV)LRQDKDVDEOHWR
address the various challenges to her call for philosophical ecumenism, so, it seems, can 
Agnes. Indeed, it seems that Agnes may have the advantage, after all.15  
 
 
References 
 
Ayer, A.J. (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz 
%DVLQJHU'DYLGµ:K\SHWLWLRQDQRPQLSRWHQWRPQLVFLHQWZKROO\JRRG*RG"¶
Religious Studies 19, pp. 25±42 
Davidson, Donald (1963) µ$FWLRQVUHDVRQVDQGFDXVHV¶ in Essays on Actions and Events, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 3-19  
'LYHUV-RKQµModal fictionalism cannot deOLYHUSRVVLEOHZRUOGVVHPDQWLFV¶, Analysis 
55, pp. 81±88 
(VKOHPDQ$QGUHZµ&DQDQDWKHLVWEHOLHYHLQ*RG"¶Religious Studies 41 (2005) 
Field, Hartry (1980) Science Without Numbers, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
*ULFH+3µ0HDQLQJ¶Philosophical Review 66, pp. 377-88  
Joyce, Richard (2005µ0RUDOILFWLRQDOLVP¶, in Mark Kalderon, ed., Fictionalism in 
Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 287±313 
Kenny, Anthony (1979) The God of the Philosophers, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
5RVHQ*LGHRQµ0RGDOILFWLRQDOLVP¶Mind 99, pp. 327-54 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1969) Being and Nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology, 
trans. Hazel Barnes, London: Methuen 
:DOWRQ.HQGDOµ)HDULQJILFWLRQV¶Journal of Philosophy 65, pp. 5-27 
 
                                                 
15
 Some of the ideas in this paper were discussed at a seminar on religious fictionalism at Durham in 
December, 2012. I am very grateful to those present for their suggestions, and especially to Chris 
Insole, Ian Kidd and Nancy Cartwright. Thanks also to Andrei Buckareff and two anonymous readers 
for comments on an earlier draft. 
